Michigan Law Review
Volume 85
Issue 5 Issue 5&6
1987

Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960
Karin M. Wentz
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, Legal Education Commons, and the Legal History
Commons

Recommended Citation
Karin M. Wentz, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1105 (1987).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol85/iss5/22

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960. By Laura Kalman. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1986. Pp. xi, 314. $35.
Legal realism developed as a challenge to the Langdellian case
method of legal education, which originated at Harvard and spread to
law schools throughout the country. 1 Realists criticized the case
method's emphasis on studying appellate opinions as the sole method
for teaching law students to identify general legal principles. The case
method strove to isolate from their context in society the rules and
principles of law that influenced judges. The American Law Institute's Restatement of the. Law project is a good example of this conceptualist approach. The Harvard professors serving as ALI reporters
were told to "simplify unnecessary complexities," and the rules they
identified were printed in "especially bold black letters" (p. 14). In the
extreme, the realists felt, this passion for legal rules and principles resulted in scholarly efforts of dubious value, such as Harvard law professor Joseph Beale's attempt to reduce the entire field of Conflict of
Laws to two principles.2
Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960, by Laura Kalman, 3 is another
in the Studies in Legal History series published by the University of
North Carolina Press in association with the American Society for
Legal History. 4 The author's intent in writing the book, she declares
in her prologue, was to provide a "case study of the interrelationship
between intellectual theory and institutional factors within the specific
context of legal education" (p. xi). To this end, she examines both
jurisprudential and institutional aspects of legal realism. 5 Kalman first
1. Christopher Columbus Langdell, dean of Harvard Law School between 1870 and 1895,
thought of law as a science, best taught as a system of rules and principles. Langdell looked for
these rules in appellate cases, which he collected and organized in casebooks. His "case method"
helped to make the university the center of legal education. P. xii.
2. P. 25. These principles were territoriality and vested rights. Beale came under heavy
attack from realists who thought his restatement of Conflict of Laws, J. BEALE, TREATISE ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935), sacrificed inevitable complexity to his desire for one logical set
of rules.
3. Laura Kalman (B.A., Pomona; J.D., UCLA; M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D., Yale) is associate professor of history at the University of California, Santa Barbara.
4. There are to date seventeen titles in the Studies in Legal History series. See, e.g., R.
NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY (1985); M. SALMON, WOMEN AND THE
LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA (1986) (reviewed in 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1109).
5. Realism was a phase of American intellectual history as well as a new method of legal
education. See, e.g., W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1968); W. TwINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973); Dawson, Legal Realism and Legal Scholarship, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 406 (1983);
Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961); Purcell, American
Jurisprudence between the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis of Democratic Theory, 75 AM.
H1sr. REV. 424 (1969); Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From
the Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 459 (1979).
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provides a competent discussion of the context and characteristics of
legal realism, comparing it to the dominant conceptualist approach.
She explains and evaluates the contributions of many of the more important realists, including Jerome Frank, William Douglas, Arthur
Corbin, and Karl Llewellyn. She then considers realism in its pedagogical aspect, tracing the effect of the realists' ideas on scholarship,
curricula, casebooks, examinations, and faculty selection in the law
schools.
In Legal Realism at Yale, Kalman finds the origins of realism in
the skepticism that led Oliver Wendell Holmes to suggest that judges
made law in response to "the felt necessities of the time" (p. 17). Kalman describes the contrast between the conceptualists who maintained
that judges simply found and applied existing legal rules to the facts
before them, and realists who pointed out the role of human idiosyncracy in decision making. Realists stressed facts over concepts, and
contended that law must be studied in social context. They eagerly
sought contributions to legal theory from other disciplines, attempting
to integrate law with psychology, sociology, economics, history, and
other social sciences.
Yale proved to be the law school most receptive to realism.
Although Kalman provides some mention of legal realists who were
doing "colonial service" 6 at lesser law schools, she focuses her inquiry
on the realists' progress in New Haven. To a somewhat lesser extent
she examines legal realism at the Harvard Law School, both because
of Harvard's preeminence in legal education and because "so much of
legal education at Yale has represented a rebellion against the Harvard
approach that it would be impossible to understand Yale without studying Harvard" (p. xi).
Kalman argues that the legal scholars of the 1920s and 1930s who
called themselves realists and who quite consciously reacted against
the type of legal education provided at Harvard nonetheless failed to
carry out the reforms they advocated. Their casebooks and examinations used the traditional conceptualist approach, and the faculty did
little to integrate the social sciences with law. 7 It was the Yale law
professors of the 1940s and 1950s who, though not calling themselves
realists, produced books and taught in conformity with realist theory. 8
6. See Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of
Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 195 (1980).
7. P. 229. Kalman does note the exceptions to this frequent failure of realist professors to
make their casebooks reflect their stated interest in the social sciences. For example, in 1930
Karl Llewellyn's textbook was titled Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales, rather than Cases
on the Law of Sales, with the "Materials" including annotations about business organization,
marketing practices, bills of lading, etc. Cases were only 33% of the book's pages. P. 79. But
for the most part, Kalman argues, the realists neglected social sciences and social policy, and
their casebooks "never realized the vision that had started the revolution." P. 95.
8. Kalman mentions in particular Yale law professors Harry Shulman, George Dession, and
Myres McDougal. Pp. 150-52.
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The impact of realism on American legal education owes much to
these "second-generation" realists, whose casebooks for the first time
successfully integrated legal materials with learning from the social
sciences. Harry Shulman's 1949 Cases on Labor Relations, for example, was written in collaboration with an economist. The book, a collection of arbitration decisions, cited all the relevant economic
literature and was designed for use not only in law schools, but also in
business schools and departments of economics, political science, and
sociology (p. 151). By 1960, Kalman concludes, the contribution of
the realists to legal education was substantial, and students were leaving law school with a better understanding of the social context of law
(p. 229).
Kalman's examination of the institutional factors that checked the
growth of legal realism at Yale yields her most detailed and convincing argument. She warns that "[h]istorians of intellectual movements
tend to forget the institutional constraints within which such movements operated" (p. xi) and she is careful not to make that mistake
herself. Her research convinced her that institutional factors might be
almost as important as intellectual theory in explaining the differences
in approach between Harvard and Yale. 9
Among the institutional factors receiving Kalman's attention is
Yale Law School's relatively poor endowment during many of the
years the realists were attempting to introduce changes (p. 121). The
school lacked sufficient funds to attract new professors, build classrooms, and improve its library. Many of the better students in the
applicant pool preferred to attend Harvard, and Yale also lost promising professors to better-paying schools.
Low salaries weren't the only cause of the faculty defections that
hampered realism's advance, however. Kalman is particularly perceptive in examining the conflicts, both personal and intellectual, among
faculty members and between the faculty and the Law School's dean.
She also demonstrates how the tensions inevitable between a professional school, jealous of its autonomy and reputation, and the university of which it is an often troublesome part, hindered the success of
the realists at Yale. Because of an unsympathetic or uncomprehending university administration, Yale's realists were repeatedly denied
funds or faculty appointments they thought crucial. 10
9. Kalman does not suggest that institutional factors were ever more important than intellectual theory in accounting for the differences in legal education at Harvard and Yale. Rather, she
maintains that such factors are often overlooked although they are deserving of study. In her
view, institutional factors interacted with flaws in realism as a legal theory and as a method of
legal education, causing the realist approach to "break down." P. 121.
10. Pp. 127-28. Charles Clark, on his last day as dean of Yale Law School, recorded his view
of what had been his duty to the law school: "My theory of administrative responsibility ... was
that I must represent my department against the needs and demands of other parts of even the
same University." P. 122.
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Kalman also suggests that a dismaying degree of anti-semitism
among Yale's administrators and faculty prevented the appointment
of some of the more talented and committed realists available for
professorships (p. 143). Aware of the reluctance of some of his colleagues to select Jews for the faculty, Thurman Arnold wryly reported
to William Douglas the difficulty the Yale governing board was having
in finding suitable candidates for law professorships: "What we want
is somebody like Jesus Christ would have been had he had conservative ideas and not been a Jew" (p. 139).
Finally, the conservatism of much of the student body also slowed
realism's development at Yale during the 1930s and 1940s. Students
avoided many of the more innovative classes and instead clustered
overwhelmingly in the "practical" courses thought to be the best preparation for a Wall Street career (p. 136). Students were reluctant to
abandon the legal certainty the conceptualist approach offered, and it
proved difficult to convince them that the study of law should be more
than just memorizing rules. An exasperated Charles Alan Wright,
teaching at the University of Minnesota Law School, recorded his
frustration in a letter to his former teacher at Yale, Fred Rodell:
I was spoiled at Yale; since everyone I knew there conceded the ridiculousness of conceptualism, I supposed that that devil had been exorcised,
and that legal realism, in greater or less degree, was everywhere triumphant. I couldn't have been more wrong. From morning to night, I
fight with my classes, with students in to see me, and with some members of the faculty, and all I get from them is: "What was good enough
for Langdell is good enough for me." Or "It's easy to decide cases. You
just take the facts and look in the law books and get your answer automatically." (Honest to goodness- I asked the student ifhe thought the
law worked like a slot machine and he said "Yes.") Or I will waste a
whole class hour going over all the possible policy ramifications of a
case, and problems of that sort in it, and someone is sure to come up
after the hour: "Mr. Wright, what is the rule of the case?" I find myself
alternating between an eager determination to stand this conceptualism
on its ear, and a feeling of why the hell am I wasting my time here. [p.
95]

Legal Realism at Yale is meticulously and imaginatively
researched. The book draws on the established scholarship on legal
realism, but supplements it with Kalman's original research into the
primary sources. Kalman interviewed many of the participants in the
Yale movement. She analyzed their casebooks and the examinations
they gave. She consulted the Deans' files at Harvard and Yale, as well
as the correspondence and reports of faculty members. She examined
the minutes of the governing bodies of Harvard and Yale and read
contemporary newspaper and magazine accounts of legal realism.
Kalman's writing style is clear, and formal without being pedantic.
She has a talent for finding descriptive and amusing anecdotes to illustrate her points. However, the book suffers somewhat from a rather
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plodding organization. And while the mass of detail offered testifies to
Kalman's meticulous research, it tends to obscure the broad outlines
of the topic, forcing the reader to struggle for synthesis.
Although Kalman concludes that "pedagogically, the realist movement had not fulfilled its promise" (p. 230), it did have a profound
effect on American legal education. The curricula of law schools today reflect the methods of the realists. And the Critical Legal Studies
movement, which in recent years has caused a furor among law faculties, is an heir to realism in questioning traditional jurisprudence. The
CLS movement, far from repudiating realism, carries on its legacy of
questioning the importance of legal rules and principles. It goes beyond realism in its emphasis on the contradictory norms of law and its
willingness to question the value of much that the realists accepted,
such as the importance of lawyers and dispute resolution. Much of
what Kalman reports of the suspicion and controversy the realists engendered among colleagues and law school alumni will be familiar to
present-day readers of law reviews and journals of legal education.
The value of Kalman's book lies not only in its careful scholarship,
but also in its perspective on contemporary legal education and its fascinating account of institutional politics. Kalman's analysis of institutional constraints on intellectual theory should be useful to those
considering intellectual movements in law schools today, such as Critical Legal Studies and the "Chicago School" of economic analysis.
Kalman reminds us that what Lenin said of law is true of legal education as well: it is a political instrument; it is politics. 11

- Karin M Wentz

11. Kalman declares that realism's "most important message" is that "all law is politics." P.
231.

